CO129-501-8 General policy in China 30-11-1926 - 30-11-1926 — Page 61

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comments, which I heartily endorse. He points out that there is still no recognized Government of China and still no

national tariff and that it is, therefore, premature to

acquiesce in the Nanking scheme: that Japan is most unlikely

to agree to such a surrender, for even the Washington

surtaxes have not yet received her imprimatur: that, if we yield, there is no limit to the exactions which may be placed

on trade by every regional authority throughout China: that what can be arbitrarily done regarding tariff can be equally

done with the other remaining treaty-rights, and probably

will be done even more quickly than we anticipate: that

British firms trading in China are on the verge of collapse

and that it is our duty to protect their interests, seeing

that we are in China only for trade: that we should be ill-

advised to take at its face value the offer of prospective

abolition of internal taxation, even if genuinely meant,

which is problematic, or practically possible (which, as regards likin, it is not), for, if the Chinese can break their treaty pledge, they can just as easily break their promises: and that it would be unfair to our traders to say

that we will support them, knowing in our hearts that we do not in the last resort mean to do so. Finally, Sir Miles

points out that a vital question of principle is at stake. It is not only tariff, but the whole fabric of the treaties that is in jeopardy (Peking telegram to Foreign Office No.

1213 of 31st July).

14.

I may add to this trenchant criticism that

there is no guarantee whatever, as the British Foreign Office

seems to think, that the seizure of tariff autonomy by the

Nanking Government would be accompanied by maintenance of the

integrity